Tuesday, July 06, 2004

Economy Set for Best Growth in 20 Years

Economy Set for Best Growth in 20 Years




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By MARTIN CRUTSINGER

(AP) The economy appears headed for a banner year despite a springtime spike in energy prices and a...


WASHINGTON (AP) - The economy appears headed for a banner year despite a springtime spike in energy prices and a recent increase in interest rates.

In fact, many analysts are forecasting that the overall economy, as measured by the gross domestic product, will grow by 4.6 percent or better this year, the fastest in two decades.

There were strong 4.5 percent growth rates in 1997 and 1999, when Bill Clinton was president and the country was in the midst of a record 10-year expansion.

But if this year's growth ends up a bit faster than that, it will be the best since the economy roared ahead at a 7.2 percent rate in 1984, a year when another Republican president - Ronald Reagan - was running for re-election.

"We are moving into a sweet spot for the economy with interest rates not too high, jobs coming back and business investment providing strength," said Diane Swonk, chief economist at Bank One in Chicago, who is predicting GDP growth of 4.8 percent this year.

President Bush is highlighting the improving economy at every opportunity while Democratic challenger John Kerry has focused on what he calls a middle class squeeze of rising health and tuition costs and laid-off workers forced to take lower-paying jobs.

Who will win on the all-important pocketbook issues? Economists aren't sure.

"It is unclear whether voters will remember the past year and the better jobs created during that period or the past four years," said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Economy.com. "It will be a close call and that is one of the reasons the election could be so close."

Assessing the economy at midyear, most private economists are sticking with the optimistic forecasts they had six months ago, even though inflation, driven by surging energy prices, rose higher than expected and the Federal Reserve started raising interest rates last month.

"We are looking for a darn good year despite the fact that we had a big jump in oil prices and interest rates are going up faster than people thought would occur," said David Wyss, chief economist at Standard & Poor's in New York.

Offsetting those drags on the economy has been stronger growth in Japan and China, which helps U.S. exports, better-than-expected consumer spending and much better job growth than analysts were expecting as the year began.

The economy has now created 1.5 million new jobs since last August, compared with a loss of 2.7 million jobs in the previous 29 months, when the country was struggling with a string of blows from a collapsing stock market to a recession and terrorist attacks.

Even with the 10 months of consecutive job gains, Bush is still facing a 1.2 million jobs deficit, from the last peak for employment in March 2001.

However, many analysts anticipate the economy will generate around 200,000 jobs per month over the next six months, a pace that would be enough to erase his deficit figure by the end of the year. That would enable him to escape being the only president since Herbert Hoover in the Great Depression to have lost jobs while in office.

Although the economy created only 112,000 jobs in June, after averaging 304,000 jobs for the previous three months, analysts expect strong job growth the rest of this year.

They predict the unemployment rate - stuck at 5.6 percent for most of this year - will improve gradually, to 5.3 percent by December, as a strengthening job market draws people back into the labor force.

Analysts also are optimistic about inflation in the months ahead, noting that oil prices recently retreated from peaks above $42 per barrel in June, and regular gasoline have declined from highs over $2 a gallon in late May. If the trend continues, inflation pressures will be eased.

The Bond Market Association's economic advisory committee, made up of economists from large financial institutions, is predicting that consumer prices will rise 3.1 percent for all of this year, a significant moderation from the 5.1 percent rate of increase through May.

The group projects overall GDP growth will be at a 20-year high of 4.7 percent, based in part on a belief that the Fed will keep to its pledge of moderation in future rate hikes because of the absence of inflation pressures.




Michael Moore, Alas


America’s corroded politics, benighted democracy, scandalous history and pliant media, have created a monster. Todd Gitlin on Fahrenheit 9/11 and Michael Moore, “the master demagogue an age of demagoguery made”.



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André Gide, when asked in 1905 whom he considered the greatest French poet of the 19th century, is said to have replied: “Victor Hugo, hélas!”

Who is the most compelling, useful filmmaker of the 21st century (so far)? Michael Moore, alas–

But now a pause for a moment of conscience. Let intellect have its due. Moore cuts plenty of corners, so how good can that be? Compelling? Useful? Moore specializes in hodgepodge. He jokes his way past the rough edges. He’s neither journalist nor documentarian, for he doesn’t set out to discover what he doesn’t already know. To patronize Michael Moore by calling him useful is to give him a pass for shoddy work, sloppy insinuations, emotional blackmail and all–around demagoguery.

He’s an entertainer (when it suits him) whose brush is so broad, at times, as to coat all evidence and logic with bursts of sensational color. His chief method is the insinuating juxtaposition. Presto, proof by association. Fahrenheit 9/11, his election year release, is like a beer commercial. When you see the gorgeous women drinking the beer, the subterranean layer of your cortex is supposed to think: if I drink, I get. This deep layer is protected by the more deliberate thought: hey, it’s all in good fun. Bush–haters can say, I knew it! Moore can say, I don’t do proofs, I do provocations.

I could go on and on in this vein – some have – with examples. Here are four:


Moore implies that a reason why Bush invaded Afghanistan was to boost UNOCAL’s prospects for building a pipeline there, for Zalmay Khalilzad once consulted for UNOCAL, supporting the Taliban then, and so did Hamid Karzai, and anyway, the Taliban visited the U. S. in March 2001 and Bush made nice, while the Taliban representative made a sexist remark. Stipulated: UNOCAL wanted a pipeline. Say it still does. Does that make UNOCAL a cause of the war? Or the cause? Might there be any others? Moore doesn’t say. “You can see where this is leading,” he says, but he doesn’t have to say it out loud. It’s Conspiracy Lite. He doesn’t attempt to reconcile his sneer at that war with his disdain for the Taliban or with former counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke’s sound–bite that the intervention was “slow and small.” He doesn’t have to. Argument isn’t his franchise.

Moore shows shoddy airport security in action and implies (mainly the cute way, with questions) that shaky airport security was intended to amp up American fear in order to sell the Iraq war. So do we want more intrusive security, or less; or is security all shuck–and–jive, a John Ashcroft ploy?

Moore shows Saddam’s pre–war Iraq as a land of cheer, kite–flying and Ferris wheels. Iraq is “a nation that has never attacked us.” (He can’t say the same of Afghanistan, so he doesn’t.) Saddam Hussein – sans WMD, sans al–Qaida collaboration, sans imminent threat, but very much avec torture and tyranny – might just as well have been some mustachio’d clown.

Moore shows Bush and his honchos being made up for television. Can you beat these phonies? But when Moore was boosting Ralph Nader in the 2000 campaign and assuring his public that Tweedlegore = Tweedlebush, was he not made up for the cameras? Was Nader not powdered? If Paul Wolfowitz uses saliva to caress his pompadour into shape, ugh, but what does gross conduct have to do with the neocon view of the world?
And then again –

Sorry, but before this vein goes one more inch, conscience must interrupt. Isn’t all the indignation about Michael Moore unseemly, to say the least, from those who’ve been rather restrained about Bush’s long list of deceptions? Then again, Moore makes thunderous propaganda, all right, but it’s our propaganda, at last, and much of it is right. He’s got more in his arsenal than cheap shots. He’s a not–so–secret weapon against the bully propaganda machine called the White House, which sold a war – a war – on delusional grounds. With jokes, outtakes, hissable villains, the mother of a dead American soldier from Flint, Michigan – a woman who could make Donald Rumsfeld weep – and rhetorical questions, and insinuating music, and bomb damage footage, and whatever else it takes, Moore gets people who don’t follow antiwar websites to see Iraqi casualties, usually invisible and countless, not to mention a bereaved mother, at length. Don’t some means justify some ends – specifically, the end of impelling people to wonder about Bush, the Saudis, the facts of the Iraqi expedition, and the class structure of the armed forces?

Look at some of the evidence of Bush’s insularity, cluelessness, and illegitimacy that Moore puts on display:


Bush was catapulted into the White House thanks to the family gift of Florida and the intervention of his party’s favorites on the Supreme Court. You’ve probably heard this before. Still, given the momentousness of those events and the power of the memory hole, the point can’t be made too often.

Moore revels in slapstick shots of Bush, especially on vacation much of 2001, down through September 10, including August 6, when the CIA briefed him that bin Laden wanted to attack inside the United States. On another occasion, Bush intones against terror, then whips out his golf club and crows to the supine press (which would never let the rest of us in on the banter): “Now watch this drive.”

Bush in Florida on 11 September, after hearing about the second plane attack on the World Trade Towers, reads a kids’ story aloud (Moore says it’s a book called “My Pet Goat” but there’s some doubt whether it’s a whole book, if you care) and stares into space for seven minutes. To say the least, it shows Bush is “in over his head,” said the talk show idol–demon Howard Stern. Some things are right even if Howard Stern says so.

Moore brandishes Craig Unger’s argument in House of Bush, House of Saud about Bush I and II ties to the Saudi chiefs (more intimate by far than Saddam’s “ties” to al–Qaida & Co.) Why the special flights for the bin Ladens after 11 September when airspace was closed? Why is the Secret Service protecting the Saudi Embassy (from Michael Moore, yet)? Moore doesn’t have the answers but the questions are well worth asking now that the national journalists have moved on. Moore is not quite cogent on the significance of the Saudi–Bush buddy system – why didn’t Carlyle Group crony James Baker love the Taliban and argue against the Afghanistan war? – but he tells the hitherto clueless or clue–impaired that Bush lived in an oil–soaked bubble of (at best) gullibility most of his life. That’s worth knowing. (But better without Moore’s leading question, “Was [Bush] thinking he needed to think about business relations?”)

Moore shows Bush opposing an independent 9/11 investigating commission – and there’s a fact that’s been shoved down the memory hole.

And Colin Powell said in February 2001 that Saddam was unable to build WMD. There’s another clip worth recycling. (American news organizations haven’t gotten around to it.)

And Bush jokes to a fancy fundraiser: “Some people call you the elite, I call you my base.”

And Moore shows that state authorities in Oregon are short–handed when it comes to antiterrorist staff.

Moore ambushes Congressmen to make the point that their kids aren’t the ones fighting Bush’s war.

Mostly, Moore argues with splices – bang, bang, and another bang. But his best moments are something quite different. As several reviewers have noted, he breaks new ground by hanging around with Lila Lipscomb, the mother of a Flint soldier killed in Iraq, and with wounded soldiers at Walter Reed Hospital. You can say it’s war, any war, but when the war’s being antisepticised, exposing some raw flesh and hurt souls can’t be a bad thing. It’s necessary. So give Moore a cheer for this.


And because, in the thick of a rolling political emergency, he’s packing in blue–state crowds and blue–niche–of–red–state crowds and who–knows–what–color–in–purple–state crowds. Fahrenheit 9/11 opened as the highest–grossing nonfiction (some would quarrel with the label, but never mind) film of all time. Its average box office take per theatre beat out – good God – Mel Gibson’s Passion of the Christ. According to Fox Sports (!), the auto racer Dale Earnhardt., Jr. – son of the eponymous lionized father – told his pit crew to see Fahrenheit 9/11, saying, hey, it'll be a good bonding experience no matter what your political belief.

Benighted democracy needs the contention that Moore provokes because the newspapers don’t provoke it, television doesn’t, the Democrats didn’t, Congress didn’t, judicious folks didn’t. No one who didn’t get worked up about the administration’s distortions re WMD, al–Qaida, and mushroom clouds has the right to pure rage against Michael Moore. He’s not running for president, after all. (More good news.) It was Moore who put the issue of Bush’s evasion of military service back in play a few months ago, when he called Bush a deserter on a platform with General Wesley Clark. That was overkill – and it filled an enormous hole.


Moore is the master demagogue an age of demagoguery made. He’s an impresario of spectacle and he corrals people who don’t pay attention to news to pay attention to him and his facts, his footage, his badinage, his sarcasm, his factoid detonations, all of it, indiscriminately, smashing up the complacency that watched George Bush seize power in the most powerful nation in history. That’s how America goes now. Still, Moore could be a better version of Moore and still be Moore. He could show us that war kills and Bush is appalling, and yet be more scrupulous. But Moore is the only Moore we have – alas. Moore is the anti–Bush, and damn if we didn’t need one.



Saddam In Custody -- Moore, Soros, Dean Still At Large

Saddam In Custody -- Moore, Soros, Dean Still At Large
June 30, 2004



The Americanization of Iraq proceeds at an astonishing pace, the Iraqis are taking to freedom like fish to water, and the possibilities for this nation are endless. It's hard to say who's more upset about these developments: the last vestiges of pro-Hussein Baathist resistance in Iraq or John Kerry's campaign manager.

The New York Times ran a front-page news story on Sunday about how life was better for Iraqi girls under Saddam Hussein -- living under Saddam, that is, not the girls who were literally under Saddam, Odai and Qusai while they were being raped. The article was titled "For Iraqi Girls, Changing Land Narrows Lives." True, they don't have to run from Odai's rape rooms anymore. But apparently not a single Iraqi female has been admitted to Augusta National Golf Club since the liberation!

The Democrats want Saddam back.

Of course we can't be sure if their presidential candidate wants Saddam back, inasmuch as John Kerry will be in an undisclosed location until Election Day. As Mickey Kaus has pointed out, every time Kerry starts campaigning, his poll numbers plummet. According to a recent New York Times poll, after $60 million in warm and fuzzy TV ads about Kerry, 40 percent of Americans have no opinion of him. In other words, the ads are working! So Kerry will be sitting out the actual campaign this year.

But he's got a lot of surrogates campaigning for him. There's Michael Moore, who has said he hopes more Americans will die in Iraq. His movie, "Fahrenheit 7/11" as we call it, apparently supports the Times' view that life in Iraq was better, sunnier, happier under Saddam Hussein. Moore has also accused the American people of being the stupidest, most naive people on the face of the Earth. And after last weekend, he's got the box office numbers to prove it!

Moore keeps whining about all the right-wing hit groups out to get him. Granted he's a large target (or what's known in baseball as a "fat pitch"). But conservatives are frankly relieved we finally have a liberal who tells the truth about what he thinks of America.

Then there's George Soros, who compared Israel to Nazi Germany and President George Bush to the Nazis. Soros later denied comparing Bush to the Nazis, saying he had merely said Bush reminded him of "the Germans." Hmmm, which Germans was Soros referring to -- the Von Trapp Family? Katarina Witt and Steffi Graf? Eric Braeden from "The Young and the Restless"? Wouldn't Soros like Bush if he were similar to the new pacifist, America-hating Germans? If not, why did liberals keep pestering us to get Germany's approval before we invaded Iraq?

Soros blames President Bush for anti-Semitism, and then proceeds directly to the usual liberal talking points attacking Israel. He says Israeli policies are to blame for anti-Semitism -- coming in a close second after the Von Trapp-like Bush -- and Israel was a large part of the reason the United States went to war with Iraq. Also oil, which would certainly explain why gas is so cheap now.

Apparently, given a choice between: (a) lifting the sanctions against Iraq so oil sales could resume, for the cost of a single phone call, and (b) a war costing $120 billion and nearly 900 U.S. lives so far, Bush chose (b). Seriously, there are still adults in the English-speaking world with opposable thumbs who believe this theory?

And then there's Howard Dean, who thinks Bush was in cahoots with the Saudis -- and he's the centrist of the bunch. I'm looking forward to Dean's address at the Democratic Convention this summer. Rumor has it he'll end with a squeal so high-pitched only dogs will be able to hear it.

I admire their savage energy, but these people want to run the country. Even with all their money and power, I don't think they could get the Haitians to let them govern. But Soros and company think they should be running the United States of America.

Apart from the fact that Kerry won't come out of hiding while allowing the nuts to attack Bush for him, these aren't random nobodies popping up to endorse Kerry. Howard Dean was considerably more likely to be the Democratic nominee for president than Joe Lieberman ever was.

Soros has vowed to spend $15 million to defeat George Bush this year -- buying himself more influence than the entire populations of several states.
Michael Moore's endorsement was proudly accepted by erstwhile Democratic presidential candidate Wesley Clark, who -- just to counterbalance his own remarks defending infanticide as "a private matter between a woman and her doctor" -- explicitly defended some of Moore's loopier remarks, which is saying something.

Come to think of it, it's no surprise they want Saddam Hussein back. He made the Democrats seem moderate by comparison.

Monday, July 05, 2004

Kerry Says He Believes Life Starts at Conception

By Jonathan Finer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 5, 2004; Page A06

Kerry Says He Believes Life Starts at Conception


DYERSVILLE, Iowa, July 4 -- As Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.) campaigned across Iowa on Sunday with Gov. Tom Vilsack, widely reported to be on Kerry's vice presidential short list, both men dodged repeated questions about whether their joint appearance might be a preview of the Democratic ticket.



But even as he tried to avoid making news Sunday, Kerry broke new ground in an interview that ran in the Dubuque, Iowa, Telegraph Herald. A Catholic who supports abortion rights and has taken heat from some in the church hierarchy for his stance, Kerry told the paper, "I oppose abortion, personally. I don't like abortion. I believe life does begin at conception."

Spokeswoman Stephanie Cutter said that although Kerry has often said abortion should be "safe, legal and rare," and that his religion shapes that view, she could not recall him ever publicly discussing when life begins.

"I can't take my Catholic belief, my article of faith, and legislate it on a Protestant or a Jew or an atheist," he continued in the interview. "We have separation of church and state in the United States of America." The comments came on the final day of a three-state Midwest swing, during which Kerry has repeatedly sought to dispel stereotypes that could play negatively among voters there.

President Bush's campaign said these instances are further evidence of what it says is Kerry's propensity for misleading flip-flops.

"John Kerry's ridiculous claim to hold conservative values and his willingness to change his beliefs to fit his audience betrays a startling lack of conviction on important issues like abortion that will make it difficult for voters to give him their trust," said Steve Schmidt, a Bush campaign spokesman.

On Sunday morning, the day the candidate's abortion comments appeared in the local paper, Kerry sat in a church pew near Vilsack, also a Catholic who supports abortion rights, and his wife, Christie, one of Kerry's earliest backers in Iowa.

Afterward, several parishioners asked him about his position on abortion and his vote against a recent bill that would have banned the late-term procedure opponents call "partial birth" abortion, according to a reporter for the Telegraph Herald who sat behind Kerry's pew. Kerry replied that he would have supported the ban if it had included an exception for the health of the mother.

Kerry took Communion during Mass, which a few Catholic bishops have publicly said he should not do because of his abortion views.

"I wish he was against abortion, but I don't think that'll get settled," said Helen Willenberg, 83, a Catholic who met Kerry later in the day. "But I still hope he wins."

Later, Kerry and Vilsack walked the same Cascade, Iowa, parade route, shaking hands with voters, but rarely walking alongside each other or conversing publicly.

"Come on up here, Mr. President, we've got room for you," said a man seated on the porch of the Hughes Realty agency, as Kerry hopped over to say hello. There were also scattered Bush signs, some Bush stickers on folks holding Kerry signs and at least one heckler, in a T-shirt that read "W in '04," who yelled, "Kerry go home."

With speculation rampant Sunday, Kerry's daughter Vanessa told CNN that even she had tried but failed to get a hint from her father about his choice as running mate.

Asked whether he had decided who would join his ticket, Kerry said, "I made a decision to get a drink and eat some lunch." Afterward, the group proceeded to Dyersville for a photo opportunity on the spot where the 1989 movie "Field of Dreams" was filmed.

Surrounded by a half-dozen Little Leaguers with baseball gloves, Kerry ambled across the diamond into the thigh-high Iowa corn. As the children's heads disappeared, the 6-foot-4 senator ducked out of view, re-creating a scene from the movie, in which long-dead baseball players vanish after a game.

Kerry took a turn at bat, fielded ground balls at second base and pitched to an assortment of kids, and later to Vanessa Kerry, who, along with her sister, Alexandra, joined him on the campaign trail over the weekend.

At an evening barbecue at a home in Independence, Iowa, Kerry told about 200 supporters how happy he was to be back in the Hawkeye State. Kerry's comeback victory in the Iowa caucuses Jan. 19 propelled him to the front of the Democratic pack.

"I was being mentioned on the obituary pages here," he said, half-jokingly, before thanking those gathered for backing him and asking them to continue their support.


© 2004 The Washington Post Company

S A D D A M ' S Interrogation logs

S A D D A M ' S
I N T E R R O G A T I O N L O G S

BY BRIAN M. SACK

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 0735 hours

Colonel Beckwith and I decided to play Good Cop/Bad Cop again. I came into the room as Bad Cop and yelled at SH. He immediately laughed at me because last week when I came in I was Good Cop and had given him a sandwich. I tried to play it off that I had some heartburn and was still Good Cop but "just a little cranky." Colonel Beckwith tried to cover for me by entering the room as Bad Cop and yelling, but that didn't seem to work either. SH muttered something but wouldn't say what.

Interrogation terminated: 0749 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 1430 hours

I tried to break the will of SH by showing him an Iraqi newspaper editorial calling for his trial and punishment. SH told me that our Psychological Ops folks obviously printed a fake newspaper. I told him I swore that I bought the paper at an off-base coffeehouse. He insisted it was a fake. I told him I crossed my heart. He said he did not believe me. I asked him what I needed to do to prove to him that it was a real newspaper and he suggested taking him to the off-base coffeehouse to see it firsthand. I asked, but Gen. Farley said absolutely no way. SH didn't say anything else aside from asking how much my PsyOps newspaper subscription cost and if there were any PsyOps coupons in it. I asked where the WMD were and he suggested I look in my copy of PsyOps Weekly.

Interrogation terminated: 1540 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 0330 hours

Woke SH quite early to catch him off-guard and groggy. I asked, "What's your first name?" and he said, "Saddam." Again I asked, "What's your first name?" and he said, "Saddam." I kept asking, "What's your first name?" and he kept saying, "Saddam." Once I had a rhythm going, I quickly asked, "Where are the WMD?" and he said, "Saddam."

Interrogation terminated: 0338 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 2210 hours

I played chess with SH, who is not too bad a chess player. At one point, my bishop took his rook. I told him that in the U.S., when you lose your rook to a bishop, it is customary to divulge a little personal secret, like maybe where the WMD are. He said we weren't in the U.S., then he took my pawn with the horse piece.

Interrogation terminated: 0122 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 2000 hours

I told SH that we would be paid a visit by Baghdad's longest-running improvisational comedy troupe, and that they often ask for audience suggestions. I had one of the players ask SH for the name of something you'd return to a department store. He said "pliers." They did a quick scene about returning pliers, and then another "player" asked for a geographic location where one might hide WMDs. SH was quiet for a long time, and so I suggested Wal-Mart.

Interrogation terminated: 0122 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 1241 hours

After lunch, SH informed us he was willing to talk. Colonel Beckwith and I sat down with him. He spoke for quite some time and answered every question fully. We believe we have made great progress and we are researching the data.

Interrogation terminated: 1551 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 0940 hours

Colonel Beckwith and I told SH that we didn't think it was particularly funny that he had us looking for "Monkey Valley" and the "Camel Ass Testing Facility" when, it turned out, there were no such locations. Also, we told him we were unable to verify the existence of Mohammad Mohahaha and we do not believe his claims of having built an "infidel ray." We told him that, as a result of our disappointment, we would be denying his TV access. He said TV sucks anyway because they don't sing about him anymore.

Interrogation terminated: 1100 hours

- - - -

Interrogation commenced: 0250 hours

I roused SH from his slumbers and told him Tariq Aziz was on the phone and wanted to know where the VX gas was. Didn't bite.

Interrogation terminated: 0252 hours

Sunday, July 04, 2004

Saving Blake

Saving Blake

When he died in 1827, William Blake was widely regarded as 'mad'. His reputation was restored by an extraordinary biography, begun by a young lawyer and finished by his wife. Richard Holmes celebrates the work of Alexander and Anne Gilchrist

Saturday May 29, 2004
The Guardian

When William Blake died in London in 1827, he was already a forgotten man. His engraved and hand-painted Songs of Innocence and of Experience had sold fewer than 20 copies in 30 years. His Prophetic Books had disappeared almost without trace. A single mysterious poem, "The Tyger", had reached the anthologies. As a poet - once read in manuscript by Coleridge, Wordsworth and Charles Lamb - he was virtually unknown outside a small circle of disciples, a group of young men who pointedly called themselves "The Ancients". Robert Southey, the Poet Laureate, magnanimously dismissed him as "a man of great, but undoubtedly insane genius".
As an artist, his reputation was little better. He was chiefly remembered as a one-time commercial engraver of grimly improving texts: Edward Young's Night Thoughts, Robert Blair's The Grave, the dark Biblical drama of the "Book of Job", and Dante's Inferno still unfinished at the time of his death. In 1830 Blake was given a short and gently patronising entry in Alan Cunningham's Lives of the Most Eminent British Painters. Blake was a lovable, minor eccentric: unworldly, self-taught and self-deluded.

Thirty years later, on November 1 1860, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, who owned a collection of Blake's unpublished manuscripts, wrote with surprising news to his friend the poet William Allingham. "A man (one Gilchrist, who lives next door to Carlyle) wrote to me the other day, saying he was writing a life of Blake, and wanted to see my manuscript by that genius... I have told him he can see it here if he will give me a day's notice."

When Gilchrist visited him, Rossetti was surprised to encounter a long-haired, dreamy, moon-faced young man who looked rather as if he had stepped out of one of his own Pre-Raphaelite paintings. Alexander Gilchrist was 32, a young writer and art critic, who announced quietly that he had been working on a life of Blake for the past six years. Indeed, he had already signed a contract with the publisher Macmillan.

Who was Blake's unexpected champion? Born in the year after Blake's death in 1828, Alexander Gilchrist had trained as a barrister in the Middle Temple. Restless in his profession, but with great determination and independence of mind, he sought freedom in freelance art criticism. He produced an outstanding article on the unfashionable artist William Etty, once renowned as an exuberant painter of Romantic nudes and erotic scenes from classical mythology. Victorian taste had turned against Etty, and his paintings were scoffingly referred to in Academy circles as "Etty's bumboats". Gilchrist determined to write a full-length biography, and turn back the tide of priggish mockery.

On the strength of a £100 commission, Gilchrist married his 23-year-old sweetheart Anne Burrows in February 1851. They spent part of their honeymoon researching Etty's life in York. They interviewed his friends, and examined his nude studies and historical pictures. This unorthodox nuptial expedition greatly appealed to Anne, who was free-thinking in her views, and impatient with the conventions of her respectable upbringing. She too hoped one day to write. Their first child was born in December 1851, and the controversial Etty biography was published in 1855, when Gilchrist was 27.

The subject of William Blake had probably been in Gilchrist's mind for more than a decade. As a student, Gilchrist had heard rumours of Blake as the eccentric erstwhile occupant of Fountain Court, which he passed through every day on the way to his legal chambers. Initially Gilchrist knew little of the poetry. As an art critic it was a copy of Blake's illustrations to the "Book of Job", found at the back of a London printshop, which first caught his eye. He never lost his sense of their astonishing power, and it was Blake's visual imagination which always remained for Gilchrist the key to his genius. Accordingly, in summer 1855 he decided to write to one of the surviving Ancients, the painter Samuel Palmer, then aged 60.

On August 23 1855, Gilchrist received a long and engaging reply, which he later reprinted entire in his biography. While praising Blake's artistic integrity, Palmer carefully dispelled the notion of Blake's madness, and replaced it with the figure of a gentle, almost Christ-like sage. "He was a man without a mask; his aim was single, his path straight-forwards, and his wants few..." At the same time Palmer hinted at a prophet from the Old Testament, rather than the New: a formidable Blake who could be highly "expressive" and emotional, and with a flashing glance that could be "terrible" towards his enemies. Gilchrist was captivated, and he and Palmer became fast friends.

A year later in 1856, the Gilchrist family moved in next to Thomas and Jane Carlyle at No 6 Cheyne Row. Carlyle, 60-year-old doyen of biographical writing, had admired Gilchrist's study of Etty. This rare mark of approval from the author of On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (1841), confirmed Gilchrist in his new vocation as biographer.

The pursuit of Blake's trail through London galleries, local museums, antique bookshops, and private collections now began in earnest. Gilchrist purchased Blake prints, and borrowed what he could not buy. Anne started her own collection of Blake's watercolours. Together they tracked down Blake's various lodgings and workshops north and south of the river, in Soho and Lambeth, and meticulously researched his three-year sojourn at Felpham, by the sea in Sussex.

Having established friendly contact with the affable Samuel Palmer, Gilchrist moved on to the other surviving Ancients. His greatest diplomatic triumph was to pierce the peppery reserve of the retired journalist, Henry Crabb Robinson, then in his 80s. Robinson - once the intimate friend of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Lamb - had kept extensive diary accounts of the whole Romantic circle during his time. They were admiring, but sceptical and extremely shrewd. In 1811 he had published a rare appreciation of Blake's work in a German magazine: "William Blake: Artist, Poet, and Religious Dreamer."

In the winter of 1859, Gilchrist submitted an outline draft of his life of Blake to the publisher Macmillan and was offered a contract. Members of the Pre-Raphaelite brotherhood were excited by the prospect of the forthcoming book, and Dante Gabriel's brother, the art critic William Michael Rossetti, encouraged Gilchrist to think in terms of an even more ambitious project. After the biography, perhaps he could edit a companion volume of Blake's poems, and a catalogue of his art work? Spurred on by these late supporters, Gilchrist promised to deliver the completed biography by spring 1862.

But after six years, the work was now close to exhausting him. Money was short, and by now the Gilchrists had four children. Gilchrist's constitution, never strong, began to fail. Sometimes he collapsed, unable to work on Blake for days on end. It was during this growing professional crisis that Anne Gilchrist began quietly to assert herself.

Anne had probably been working as Alexander's part-time research assistant ever since the Etty days. But now she became his full-time amanuensis. She took dictation, copied Blake's manuscripts, checked facts and dates at the British Museum, and prepared an index.

The book was lucidly organised in 38 short chapters, and Gilchrist sent the first eight to the printers in September 1861. He promised to send in the next batch by November, with the aim of having the complete work in proof by the following spring. But on November 20 1861, Gilchrist wrote to his publisher that he had been unable to send the next "big mass of copy".

He explained that "domestic troubles have during the last month stood in the way". For six weeks his eldest daughter, seven year old Beatrice, had been lying dangerously ill at Cheyne Row with scarlet fever. Anne had insisted on a "rigid quarantine", remaining alone in the child's sickroom to carry out all the nursing herself. A week later, just as little Beatrice began to pull through, Gilchrist was himself struck down. Ten days after he had sent his desperate letter, Alexander Gilchrist slipped into a coma.

Anne later wrote: "The brain was tired with stress of work; the fever burned and devastated like a flaming fire: to four days of delirium succeeded one of exhaustion, of stupor; and then the end; without a word, but not without a look of loving recognition. It was on a wild and stormy night, November 30th 1861, that his spirit took flight."

Alexander Gilchrist died at the age of 33. His great biography of Blake, his labour of love, had been wonderfully researched and written. But it was unfinished.

With her peculiar force and independence, Anne Gilchrist immediately determined to finish the biography for him. Less than a week after Alexander's death, she wrote to Macmillan on December 6 1861: "I try to fix my thoughts on the one thing that remains for me to do for my dear Husband. I do not think that anyone but myself can do what has to be done to the Book. I was his amanuensis."

She packed up his papers, returned a mass of borrowed pictures and manuscripts, refused Jane's invitation to move in with the Carlyles, and took the children and the unfinished book down to a clapboard cottage in tiny village of Shottermill, a mile from Haslemere in Sussex.

To understand what happened next, we have to turn to Anne Gilchrist's own story. She was born in February 1828 in Gower Street, London, but partly brought up in the country at Colne in Essex. Anne's father was a London lawyer, strict and demanding, who died when she was only 11. From then on, the family were on their own, and Anne was in some sense a liberated spirit. They moved to Highgate, where Anne went to school, a handsome tomboy, clever and rebellious.

In 1847 she was devastated by the death of her "angel brother" Johnnie. A year later, aged 20, she announced her engagement to one of Johnnie's friends, Alexander Gilchrist, "great, noble and beautiful". He was probably a substitute brother. She deeply admired him, but from what she said later, she was never truly in love.

After the birth of their four children she set herself to earn additional household money by writing small pieces for the monthly magazines, and Chambers Encyclopaedia. Unexpectedly, she made a speciality of popular science subjects. Moreover, she was remarkably successful. In 1859, the year of Darwin's On the Origin of Species, she wrote a controversial article on the newly discovered gorilla, "Our Nearest Relation", comparing its skills and habits to homo sapiens.

Anne claimed the work on the biography came to her as a kind of posthumous collaboration. "Alex's spirit is with me ever - presides in my home, speaks to me in every sweet scene; broods over the peaceful valleys; haunts the grand wild hill tops; shines gloriously forth in setting sun, and moon and stars." This may have been true, but she was also driven by other, though no less powerful emotions. Essentially, she seems to have felt guilty about Gilchrist's death.

Nearly a decade later, in September 1871, she wrote a remarkable confession of her own. "I think... my sorrow was far more bitter, though not so deep, as that of a loving tender wife. As I stood by him in the coffin, I felt such remorse [that] I had not, could not have, been more tender to him - such a conviction that if I had loved him as he deserved to be loved he would not have been taken from us. To the last my soul dwelt apart and unmated, and his soul dwelt apart and unmated."

Anne already knew much of Alexander's method of working, and his perfectionism. What she did not know was whether she could match it. She wrote to Macmillan: "Many things were to have been inserted - anecdotes etc. collected during the last year, which he used to say 'would be the best things in the book'. Whether I shall be able to rightly use the rough notes of these and insert them in the fittest places I cannot yet tell."

Who, then, finally wrote Gilchrist's Life of William Blake?

Anne regarded the text of the biography as sacred to Gilchrist's memory. She was its sole guardian. "I think you will not find it hard to forgive me a little reluctance," she wrote to William Rossetti, "that any living tones should blend with that voice which here speaks for the last time on earth."

But how far she herself added new materials from Alexander's notes, or made stylistic changes, must remain problematic. In April 1862 she was speaking of "incorporating all the additional matter contained in the notes" into a final draft, which sounds quite radical. But to the end of her days Anne insisted that she was nothing more than her husband's "editor". Since Gilchrist's original manuscript has not survived, there is no way of knowing precisely how she understood this role.

The Life was finally published in two volumes in October 1863. Two thousand copies were printed, and reviews appeared rapidly. There were some initial doubts whether the biography would, as Anne put it, "shock devout minds". One reviewer observed: "a more timid biographer might have hesitated about making so open an exhibition of his hero's singularities." But it was soon clear that the book would be a triumph. It was widely admired by the entire Pre-Raphaelite circle: Robert Browning wrote a fan letter, and Samuel Palmer spoke for the Ancients when he described it as "a treasure".

The great strengths of the work, which Anne had so faithfully preserved, were quickly apparent. Gilchrist's approach is lively, personal, enthusiastic and often humorous - quite unlike much over-earnest mid-Victorian biography. The quick, informal, darting style of his prose lends a sense of continual discovery and excitement to the narrative, and yet allows for virtuoso passages of description and summary.

He also quotes brilliantly throughout from Blake's own works, both prose and poetry, much of it quite unknown to contemporary readers, such as the early "Notes on Lavater" and the "Proverbs of Hell". He was, too, the first Victorian writer to pick out and reprint in full Blake's great "Jerusalem" hymn from the Preface to Milton, "And did those feet in ancient times".

Gilchrist reverts continually to Blake's visions: calmly asking what exactly they were, how Blake described them, and how they should be accounted for. Much apparently outlandish behaviour, such as the "scandalous" Adam and Eve nude sunbathing incident at Lambeth, is given a reasonable and detailed explanation, in this case with a amusing reminder about the poet Shelley's enthusiasm for the early naturist movement.

Chapter 35, boldly entitled: "Mad or Not Mad?" is in many ways the psychological key to the entire biography. Here Gilchrist carefully defines the "special faculty" of Blake's imagination, and vindicates the profound spiritual sanity of the "gentle yet fiery-hearted mystic". One after another, he calls to witness all Blake's circle of friends, from Flaxman and Fuseli to Palmer and Linnell.

In a robust passage Gilchrist rejects any modish Victorian interpretation of Blake's visions. "No man, by the way, would have been more indifferent or averse than he (wide and tolerant as was his faith in supernatural revelations) towards the table-turning, wainscot-knocking, bosh-propounding 'Spiritualism' of the present hour." Instead Gilchrist finally champions Blake in terms that Carlyle would have recognised: "Does not prophet or hero always seem 'mad' to the respectable mob, and to polished men of the world...?"

Gilchrist had a gift for evoking particular London streets, characteristic clusters of buildings or courtyards, and beyond them certain rural landscapes and secluded villages, where Blake had lived and worked. In this way, the biography first gave Blake's extraordinary imaginative life "a local habitation and a name". The descriptions of the gothic interior of Westminster Abbey, or of Hercules Building (and its garden) in Lambeth, or of the cottage and seashore at Felpham and the last, hidden lodgings at Fountain Court are especially evocative. The final picture of Blake "chaunting Songs" to Catherine, as he lay on his deathbed in the little upper room above the Thames, is unforgettable.

Gilchrist's Life of William Blake, with its combative subtitle Pictor Ignotus (The Unknown Painter), is one of the most influential of all the great mid-Victorian biographies. It rescued its subject from almost total obscurity, challenged the notion of Blake's madness, and first defined his genius as both an artist and visionary poet combined. It set the agenda for modern Blake studies and remains the prime source for all modern Blake biographies. It remains wonderfully readable today, and salvaged from death, it still vibrates with extraordinary life.

Yet like so many works of art, it was produced at great cost, and under mysterious conditions. In the absence of an original manuscript of the 1863 biography, the mystery will always remain just how much of this first, ground-breaking text we really owe to Alexander Gilchrist or to Anne; or to some indefinable Blakean collaboration between the two.

· This is an edited extract from Richard Holmes's introduction to The Life of William Blake by Alexander Gilchrist, to be published by Harper Perennial in August

· Richard Holmes appears at the Guardian Hay Festival on Friday. Box office 0870 990 1299. www.hayfestival.com

Saturday, July 03, 2004

definitions reversed



A Broad but Not Infinite Church
The Meanings of Liberalism
Gregory Melleuish and Imre Salusinszky

Writing in The Australian recently, columnist Janet Albrechtsen claimed that it would be a ‘perishing’ version of conservatism that refused to admit Malcolm Turnbull to the fraternity simply because of his prominent role in the republic referendum. The heated response she elicited showed, first, that there are conflicting definitions of ‘conservatism’ around. Second, it reaffirmed that in politics, as in pharmaceuticals or parcel delivery, labels do matter.
But very few people in Australian political history have fought over who gets to be called a conservative. In fact they have recognised that being stuck with the conservative label can well mean the political kiss of death. What has been fought over much more bitterly has been the right to be known as a liberal—indeed, the issue surfaced all over again in arguments over the legacy of former Victorian Premier Sir Rupert Hamer. And right now, there is no label more in danger than ‘liberal’ of being rendered meaningless.
An article titled ‘Stuck in the Middle’ in The Australian last year pondered how ‘John Howard’s decision to stay on has left small-l liberals lamenting their lot’. Among the liberals canvassed were: former communist Stuart Macintyre, who continues to write glowingly of the communist contribution to Australian history; novelist Marion Halligan, who on a 7.30 Report panel in 2002 suggested that the September 11 terrorists were ‘incredibly brave’ and promoting a ‘form of humanity’, adding that the most chilling thing she had heard since the terror attacks was Americans singing patriotic songs; and historian Humphrey McQueen, who as recently as 1999 publicly reconfirmed his vows to Maoism.
The term ‘liberal’ is notoriously slippery, but there would surely be an argument against extending it to cover an adherent of Maoism, an ideology that resulted in the slaughter of an estimated 35 million Chinese in the cause of absolute state power. Such a strange menagerie of liberals was reminiscent of the column in 2000 in which Phillip Adams, a former communist who even now refuses to concede that capitalism has been an improvement in Russia, lambasted John Howard for not being liberal enough.
Or are we all liberals now? After the demise of the Soviet Union over ten years ago, liberalism was left standing as the only coherent political philosophy of reform. In the light of 20th century history it was a startling outcome. In the 1930s, the world seemed to be headed for either a fascist or a communist future. For the hard ‘new men’ of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union, liberals were regarded with contempt as weak and decadent. They were yesterday’s men. But as the dominoes fell one by one it turned out that yesterday’s men were those, especially among the intelligentsia, who had welcomed these brutal authoritarian leviathans as the tomorrow people.

We haven’t been in this situation since the second half of the 19th century when everyone in political life in Australia wanted to be known as a liberal. It was a situation not unlike today. In the wake of the failed 1848 revolutions many who had once described themselves as radicals, and who had wanted radical political change, sought to change their spots and to re-describe themselves as ‘liberals’. By 1860 people who had formerly been radicals or conservatives sought to stand under the same umbrella as those who had always called themselves liberal. Liberalism had become the only game in town.
But unfortunately, when everyone wants to be a liberal this indicates not so much that liberal ideals of individualism and freedom have triumphed, but that ‘liberalism’ has become a label on which some very strange ideas can be printed. This is the situation to which we have returned.
Consider the weird permutations of the term in 19th century Australia. Liberals at first were strong supporters of self-reliance and minimum government interference in their lives. To be a liberal in 1860 meant, almost by definition, to uphold free trade. But within a few years there were people calling themselves liberals who advocated protection of industry and other forms of government control. They called those who adhered to principles of self-reliance and individual initiative ‘conservatives’. A ‘liberal’ such as C. H. Pearson could justify this change by arguing that state intervention was the logical outcome of the application of liberal principles.
By the early 20th century in Australia, those who followed Pearson’s casuistical logic appropriated the term liberal. These included his former student Alfred Deakin who used the term to mean essentially a form of state socialism. Deakin dominated the politics of the first decade of the 20th century in Australia. ‘Liberals’ sang the praises of the White Australia Policy. Those who believed in free markets and the individual and showed no great enthusiasm for racist immigration policies were called ‘conservatives’—though not all conservatives embraced these ideas—and were seen as outmoded and reactionary. They were yesterday’s people. Protection, arbitration and state paternalism were the means through which the state would create the hard and virile Australian ‘new man’.
So when the Free traders and Deakinites came together in their shotgun wedding in 1910, it was clear that this fused entity would call itself the Liberal Party. Both groups claimed the term ‘liberal’ for themselves, even if they meant by it quite different things. But the Deakinite meaning stuck for much of the 20th century, despite the fact that many of those who copped the label ‘conservative’ believed in free markets, while a lot of so-called liberals often sang the praises of government intervention, and sometimes practised social engineering. After all, as John Gorton once claimed, we are all socialists now.
Much of this changed around 25 years ago when liberals who believed in freedom and individualism were able to come out of the conservative closet, reconnecting with the classical liberalism practised in 19th century Britain and initially in Australia.
The re-birth of liberalism was not before time. Australian conservatives have believed in some odd ideas. Many, from B. A. Santamaria to Robert Manne, have been less than enthusiastic about free markets and the individual. Santamaria often waxed lyrical about the less than liberal policies of Singapore while Manne has been an enthusiastic advocate of state intervention and protective tariffs.

Meanwhile there were many who were comfortable with the now long established idea that liberalism involved state intervention. They found the notion that people might do things for themselves, rather than being told what to by bureaucrats and intellectuals, a bit of a threat. In their eyes they were the true liberals and these newcomers were immoral interlopers. So they invented the term ‘neo-liberal’ to describe liberals who believed in free markets and individualism, as a means of keeping the liberal tag for themselves and casting aspersions on those who had the nerve to believe that liberalism might be connected with doing things for oneself.
Consequently, the honeymoon for liberals, that is to say real liberals, has been all too short. Adherents of the old state socialist ideal now know that they won’t get their ideas up by calling themselves socialists. Socialism smells of coercion and of the gulag and of being told what sorts of clothes to wear. But if they can call themselves liberals then they might have a chance. This is because possession of the term ‘liberal’ turns one miraculously into a moderate. If ‘liberal’ can be manipulated to become synonymous with ‘Left’, then those who believe in free trade, small government and market solutions—all core liberal values—can be configured as right-wing ratbags. Equally state control and direction also suddenly become ‘moderate’ policies even if the outcome is coercion and thought control. Hence state monopoly of education can be construed as a ‘liberal’ policy even if the consequences of such a monopoly are decidedly illiberal.
In this project the Left has been helped both by the broad meaning of the word ‘liberal’ in British and Australian usage, and by the specific, but heterodox, centre-Left sense of the term in the United States. There, religion plays a much more powerful role in political life, and in the culture generally, than in Australia or Britain. Hence, attitudes on social issues such as the rights of women and minorities, gay marriage and abortion, have more force in determining political labelling in America.
Thus, it is to those with a liberal view on such issues that the term ‘liberal’ has adhered in the United States, even though many of those on the conservative side have more liberal views on questions such as government intervention in the economy, or free trade. Yet when one looks at the social policies of US liberals through British or Australian liberal eyes, one often sees a faux-liberalism based on equality and entitlement, enabled by the state, rather than on liberty.
It must nevertheless be conceded that in recent times many Australian liberals who believe in free markets have become closely identified with social conservatism, as personified by John Howard. Fine, but this now needs counterbalancing by liberals who are prepared to apply a more freedom-based paradigm to social issues. The reason why such issues have received only muted attention from liberals lately is not so far to seek: such issues were given a bad name by Paul Keating and all who sailed with him.
To abandon the British and Australian sense of the term ‘liberal’ and adopt the US sense is confusing. It concedes ground that must not be conceded. After all, Americans do not consider people such as Noam Chomsky or Michael Moore—two heroes of the Australian cultural Left—to be liberals: they are leftists. Copybook US liberals such as the Clintons, or Edward Kennedy, would be somewhere to the right of Mark Latham.
But above all, it is the unbreakable connection between liberalism and free trade in British liberal thought that is most compelling, and that should make us hesitate before conceding the term to the Left. Free trade is central to liberalism because it embodies two of liberalism’s central values. The first of these is the belief that individuals should stand on their own two feet without being propped up by the state. The second is the principle that it is not the job of the state to ‘pick winners’ and to favour particular or vested interests.

Liberalism received its most powerful incarnation in the 19th century when English politicians such as Cobden and Gladstone realised that the Corn Laws, or grain tariffs, were harming the poor in England by raising the price of bread. By abolishing such tariffs the English government recognised that it was wrong to prop up artificially one particular interest when others, including the poor, had to bear the cost.
In Australia in the late 19th century George Reid recognised the same truth when, as Premier of New South Wales, he slashed tariffs. It was the working classes who benefited from the resulting drop in price of food and other essential items. Everything that liberalism means in its British and Australian usage flows from the insight that state intervention, especially in the form of tariffs, not only hurts many people but also destroys individual self-reliance.
Since this realisation, it has been free trade, not social justice advocacy, that has done most to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor and to create the conditions under which a free society can prosper. It did so within the industrialised world in Gladstone’s time, and it does so in ours between the industrialised and developing worlds.
The Labor governments of both Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke were among the most vigorous free-traders in Australia’s history. The Left, which is far from being the same thing as Labor, distrusts markets and distrusts the workings of international trade. Just as it once supported White Australia now it throws itself into another irrational attempt to keep the wider world out of Australia: anti-globalisation. There is no shred of liberalism in such a view. Nevertheless, most of the members of the Left who would appropriate the term liberal for themselves are strong believers in using the state to keep the dark forces of globalisation, be they economic or cultural, out of Australia.
Some right-of-centre polemicists in Australia have been extremely sloppy in extending the US sense of ‘liberal’ pejoratively to the Australian cultural Left. And it is a label that the Left has been only too happy to accept, as it tries to shake itself free of the stigma—nay, even the memory—of its long historical infatuation with various totalitarianisms.
Liberalism is indeed a broad church: for example, unlike ‘conservative’, it pretty well describes the mainstream leadership groups of both our major political parties. It is a term that can comfortably embrace all those who place a very high value on individual and economic freedom, and who seek to create a peaceful world founded on those freedoms. After all, it has proved to be the only set of political and economic principles that has gone the distance in the modern world.
Maoists, however, need not apply.

About the authors
Gregory Melleuish is Associate Professor of history and politics at the University of Wollongong. Imre Salusinszky is a columnist and editorial writer with The Australian. They co-edited Blaming Ourselves: September 11 and the Agony of the Left (Duffy & Snellgrove, 2002).

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

Political Hay
Blood for Power Print Friendly Format
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By Paul Beston
Published 6/30/2004 12:08:07 AM


President Bush's overall approval rating and his standing versus John Kerry tend to rise and fall with his Iraq numbers. He has experienced a brutal six months, with military setbacks, intelligence failures, a prison scandal, 9/11 hearings, several negative books, and now a blockbuster anti-Bush film, Fahrenheit 911. Yet for all of that, the race is a dead heat. While pollsters may discuss other issues like health care and education, intuition says that the election is all about Bush and the war.

It stands to reason, then, that Kerry's hopes in November depend greatly on U.S. failure in Iraq. Fahrenheit 911 underscores this point. The focus of hard-lefties like Michael Moore, as well as a good deal of the Democratic Party, is on weakening a wartime president so that he is unable to prosecute the war effectively and goes down to defeat. Unfortunately, success in this endeavor carries with it certain real-world consequences, like U.S. casualties, the failure of U.S. policy, and the empowerment of our enemies.

Such is the Faustian bargain the Democrats are making -- dead Americans in exchange for the presidency. Are they really willing to trade U.S. success in Iraq for the White House? Unfortunately, they have already answered. The presence of leading Democrats at Fahrenheit's Washington premiere should remind us of what that answer is. They are willing to cripple the war effort if doing so will defeat the president.

Kerry's absence from the Fahrenheit premiere is less important than his silence about the film. Sooner or later, someone will ask him about it, and he'll give a tortured answer. Whatever he says or seems to say, it won't be a condemnation. If there's anything to bank on between now and November, that's it.

The Democrats showed their colors long before Moore came to town. Their obsession with Abu Ghraib, their barely-contained glee at the inability to find weapons of mass destruction, and their posturing over the intelligence failures in Iraq and in the 9/11 hearings are just a handful of examples. The party wants to return to the White House, and it needs death and disaster to get there.

The Left, and much of the Democratic Party, see George W. Bush as a tyrant; a "miserable failure," in the words of Richard Gephardt; a Fascist by the lights of a sitting federal judge and a former vice president; and a war criminal in the view of a party-endorsed propagandist. So ousting him would be worth more than a little sacrifice. (Maybe Moore can reprise a scene in his film and ask liberals if they would be willing to send their children to die in exchange for Bush's defeat.) If the price of beating Bush is losing the war, and losing the war by necessity means the death of U.S. troops in substantial numbers, isn't that a fair price to pay? The future of civilization is at stake.

The Left has been down this road before. They wanted us out of Vietnam, and the way to accomplish that was to demoralize the American public, thereby emboldening the enemy and ensuring a protracted struggle, and more casualties. The body bags they pretended to decry were crucial to their success; they relied on death far more than did the warmakers they demonized. Theirs was the most bloodthirsty peace movement in American history.

Thirty-five years later, it's a replay. The Democrats need for the United States to lose in Iraq, whether that means a military withdrawal under duress, the collapse of the government that just took over, or some other dark scenario.

The Left didn't get this far by telling the truth, so naturally they will never admit such things. They'll go on mouthing platitudes about how they "support the troops," all the while spreading slanders against the commander of those troops that weaken his ability to protect them and bring them home alive. And they'll know, no matter how they deny it, that every dead soldier or Marine they see on the television helps to advance their cause. They give different names to that cause -- anti-Bush, anti-war -- but no matter their goal, the means is the same: the defeat of the United States.

Their standard bearer, John Kerry, became famous in 1971 with a question: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?"

Thirty-three years later, it's Senator Kerry's turn to answer a question: How do you ask for a nation's support when your success depends on its failure?


Paul Beston is a writer in New York City.



TAG
"Many of you are well enough off that ... the tax cuts may have helped you," Sen. Clinton said. "We're saying that for America to get back on track, we're probably going to cut that short and not give it to you. We're going to take things away from you on behalf of the common good."

Monday, June 28, 2004

Iranian woman 'gives birth to frog'
TAG


Tests are being carried out on the frog
An Iranian newspaper has reported the controversial story of a woman who claims to have given birth to a frog.
The Iranian daily Etemaad says the creature is believed to have grown from larva to an adult frog inside her body.

While it is unclear how this could have happened, the paper carries quotes from medical experts who say there are human characteristics to the animal.

It has been speculated that the woman, who has not been named, unknowingly picked up the larva while she was swimming in a dirty pool.

The woman, from the south-eastern city of Iranshahr, is a mother of two children.

The "so-called frog", as the newspaper puts it, has yet to undergo precise genetic and anatomic tests.

But it quotes clinical biology expert Dr Aminifard as saying: "The similarities are in appearance, the shape of the fingers and the size and shape of the tongue."

Medical history recounts stories of people who believed they had frogs - or even lizards or snakes - living and growing in their bodies.

One of the most famous was the 17th Century case of Catharina Geisslerin, known as "the toad-vomiting woman" of Germany.

When she died in 1662 doctors are said to have performed an autopsy, but found no evidence animals had ever lived inside her body.

Thursday, June 24, 2004

Sarasota principal defends Bush from "Fahrenheit 9/11" portrayal
By Associated Press
June 24, 2004

SARASOTA — Michael Moore's film "Fahrenheit 9/11" criticizes President Bush for listening to Sarasota second-graders read a story for nearly seven minutes after learning the nation was under attack on Sept. 11, 2001.

But Gwendolyn Tose'-Rigell, the principal at Emma E. Booker Elementary School, says Bush handled himself properly.

"I don't think anyone could have handled it better," Tose'-Rigell told the Sarasota Herald-Tribune in a story published Wednesday. "What would it have served if he had jumped out of his chair and ran out of the room?"

"Fahrenheit 9/11," which won the top honor at last month's Cannes Film Festival, portrays the White House as asleep at the wheel before the Sept. 11 attacks. Moore accuses Bush of fanning fears of future terrorism to win public support for the Iraq war.

Bush told the federal 9/11 Commission, which released its report last week, that he remained in the classroom because he felt it was "important to project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening." Moore says Bush failed to take charge.

Tose'-Rigell, who was at Bush's side, did not hear what White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered when he squeezed past her to tell the president of the attacks, but "I knew it was something serious."

"The president bit his lip and clenched his jaw," she said. "I didn't know what happened, whether it was something with his wife or children or something with the nation. I remember praying that God would watch over our school and protect our children."

She said the video doesn't convey all that was going on in the classroom, but Bush's presence had a calming effect and "helped us get through a very difficult day."

Tose'-Rigell said she plans to publish her account of the morning of Sept. 11 from pages she wrote in her journal following the attack. The principal said she didn't vote for Bush. "But that day I would have voted for him."

Wednesday, June 23, 2004

Feeding the Minotaur
Our strange relationship with the terrorists continues.



As long as the mythical Athenians were willing to send, every nine years, seven maidens and seven young men down to King Minos's monster in the labyrinth, Athens was left alone by the Cretan fleet. The king rightly figured that harvesting just enough Athenians would remind them of their subservience without leading to open rebellion — as long as somebody impetuous like a Theseus didn't show up to wreck the arrangement.




Ever since the storming of the Tehran embassy in November 1979 we Americans have been paying the same sort of human tribute to grotesque Islamofascists. Over the last 25 years a few hundred of our own were cut down in Lebanon, East Africa, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, and New York on a semi-annual basis, even as the rules of the tribute to be paid — never spoken, but always understood — were rigorously followed.

In exchange for our not retaliating in any meaningful way against the killers — addressing their sanctuaries in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, or Syria, or severing their financial links in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and their various state-sanctioned kindred operatives agreed to keep the number killed to reasonable levels. They were to reap their lethal harvests abroad and confine them mostly to professional diplomats, soldiers, or bumbling tourists, whose disappearance we distracted Americans would predictably chalk up to the perils of foreign service and exotic travel.

Despite the occasional fiery rhetoric, both sides found the informal Minoan arrangement mutually beneficial. The terrorists believed that they were ever so incrementally, ever so insidiously eroding America's commitment to a pro-Western Middle East. We offered our annual tribute so that over the decades we could go from Dallas to Extreme Makeover and Madonna to Britney without too much distraction or inconvenience.

But then a greedy, over-reaching bin Laden wrecked the agreement on September 11. Or did he?

Murdering 3,000 Americans, destroying a city block in Manhattan, and setting fire to the Pentagon were all pretty tough stuff. And for a while it won fascists and their state sponsors an even tougher response in Afghanistan and Iraq that sent hundreds to caves and thousands more to paradise. And when we have gotten serious in the postbellum reconstruction, thugs like Mr. Sadr have backed down. But before we gloat and think that we've overcome our prior laxity and proclivity for appeasement, let us first make sure we are not still captives to the Minotaur's logic.

True, al Qaeda is now scattered, the Taliban and Saddam gone. But the calculus of a quarter century — threaten, hit, pause, wait; threaten, hit, pause, wait — is now entrenched in the minds of Middle Eastern murderers. Indeed, the modus operandi that cynically plays on Western hopes, liberalism, and fair play is gospel now to all sorts of bin Laden epigones — as we have seen in Madrid, Fallujah, and Najaf.

Much has been written about our problems with this postmodern war and why we find it so difficult to fully mobilize our formidable military and economic clout to crush the terrorists and their patrons. Of course, we have no identifiable conventional enemy such as Hitler's Panzers; we are not battling a fearsome nation that defiantly declared war on us, such as Tojo's Japan; and we are no longer a depression-era, disarmed, impoverished United States at risk for our very survival. But then, neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor Tojo nor Stalin ever reached Manhattan and Washington.

So al Qaeda is both worse and not worse than the German Nazis: It is hardly the identifiable threat of Hitler's Wehrmacht, but in this age of technology and weapons of mass destruction it is more able to kill more Americans inside the United States. Whereas we think our fascist enemies of old were logical and conniving, too many of us deem bin Laden's new fascists unhinged — their fatwas, their mythology about strong and weak horses, and their babble about the Reconquista and the often evoked "holy shrines" are to us dreamlike.

But I beg to differ somewhat.

I think the Islamists and their supporters do not live in an alternate universe, but instead are no more crazy in their goals than Hitler was in thinking he could hijack the hallowed country of Beethoven and Goethe and turn it over to buffoons like Goering, prancing in a medieval castle in reindeer horns and babbling about mythical Aryans with flunkies like Goebbels and Rosenberg. Nor was Hitler's fatwa — Mein Kampf — any more irrational than bin Laden's 1998 screed and his subsequent grainy infomercials. Indeed, I think Islamofascism is brilliant in its reading of the postmodern West and precisely for that reason it is dangerous beyond all description — in the manner that a blood-sucking, stealthy, and nocturnal Dracula was always spookier than a massive, clunky Frankenstein.

Like Hitler's creed, bin Ladenism trumpets contempt for bourgeois Western society. If once we were a "mongrel" race of "cowboys" who could not take casualties against the supermen of the Third Reich, now we are indolent infidels, channel surfers who eat, screw, and talk too much amid worthless gadgetry, godless skyscrapers, and, of course, once again, the conniving Jews.

Like Hitler, bin Ladenism has an agenda: the end of the liberal West. Its supposedly crackpot vision is actually a petrol-rich Middle East free of Jews, Christians, and Westerners, free to rekindle spiritual purity under Sharia. Bin Laden's al Reich is a vast pan-Arabic, Taliban-like caliphate run out of Mecca by new prophets like him, metering out oil to a greedy West in order to purchase the weapons of its destruction; there is, after all, an Israel to be nuked, a Europe to be out-peopled and cowered, and an America to be bombed and terrorized into isolation. This time we are to lose not through blood and iron, but through terror and intimidation: televised beheadings, mass murders, occasional bombings, the disruption of commerce, travel, and the oil supply.

In and of itself, our enemies' ambitions would lead to failure, given the vast economic and military advantages of the West. So to prevent an all out, terrible response to these predictable cycles of killing Westerners, there had to be some finesse to the terrorists' methods. The trick was in preventing some modern Theseus from going into the heart of the Labyrinth to slay the beast and end the nonsense for good.

It was hard for the Islamic fascists to find ideological support in the West, given their agenda of gender apartheid, homophobia, religious persecution, racial hatred, fundamentalism, polygamy, and primordial barbarism. But they sensed that there has always been a current of self-loathing among the comfortable Western elite, a perennial search for victims of racism, economic oppression, colonialism, and Christianity. Bin Laden's followers weren't white; they were sometimes poor; they inhabited of former British and French colonies; and they weren't exactly followers of the no-nonsense Pope or Jerry Falwell. If anyone doubts the nexus between right-wing Middle Eastern fascism and left-wing academic faddishness, go to booths in the Free Speech area at Berkeley or see what European elites have said and done for Hamas. Middle Eastern fascist killers enshrined as victims alongside our own oppressed? That has been gospel in our universities for the last three decades.

Like Hitler, bin Ladenism grasped the advantages of hating the Jews. It has been 60 years since the Holocaust; memories dim. Israel is not poor and invaded but strong, prosperous, and unapologetic. It is high time, in other words, to unleash the old anti-Semitic infectious bacillus. Thus Zionists caused the latest Saudi bombings, just as they have poisoned Arab-American relations, just as neo-conservatives hijacked American policy, just as Feith, Perle, and Wolfowitz cooked up this war.

Finally, bin Laden understood the importance of splitting the West, just like the sultan of old knew that a Europe trisected into Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism would fight among itself rather than unite against a pan-Islamic foe. Hit the Spanish and bring in an anti-American government. Leave France and Germany alone for a time so they can blame the United States for mobilizing against a "nonexistent" threat, unleashing the age-old envy and jealously of the American upstart.

If after four years of careful planning, al Qaedists hit the Olympics in August, the terrorists know better than we do that most Europeans will do nothing — but quickly point to the U.S. and scream "Iraq!" And they know that the upscale crowds in Athens are far more likely to boo a democratic America than they are a fascist Syria or theocratic Iran. Just watch.

In the European mind, and that of its aping American elite, the terrorists lived, slept, and walked in the upper aether — never the streets of Kabul, the mosques of Damascus, the palaces of Baghdad, the madrassas of Saudi Arabia, or the camps of Iran. To assume that the latter were true would mean a real war, real sacrifice, and a real choice between the liberal bourgeois West and a Dark-Age Islamofascist utopia.

While all Westerners prefer the bounty of capitalism, the delights of personal freedom, and the security of modern technological progress, saying so and not apologizing for it — let alone defending it — is, well, asking a little too much from the hyper sophisticated and cynical. Such retrograde clarity could cost you, after all, a university deanship, a correspondent billet in Paris or London, a good book review, or an invitation to a Georgetown or Malibu A-list party.

Nearly three years after 9/11 we are in the strangest of all paradoxes: a war against fascists that we can easily win but are clearly not ready to fully wage. We have the best 500,000 soldiers in the history of civilization, a resolute president, and an informed citizenry that has already received a terrible preemptive blow that killed thousands.

Yet what a human comedy it has now all become.

The billionaire capitalist George Soros — who grew fabulously wealthy through cold and calculating currency speculation, helping to break many a bank and its poor depositors — now makes the moral equation between 9/11 and Abu Ghraib. For this ethicist and meticulous accountant, 3,000 murdered in a time of peace are the same as some prisoners abused by renegade soldiers in a time of war.

Recently in the New York Times I read two articles about the supposedly new irrational insensitivity toward Muslims and saw an ad for a book detailing how the West "constructed" and exaggerated the Islamic menace — even as the same paper ran a quieter story about a state-sponsored cleric in Saudi Arabia's carefully expounding on the conditions under which Muslims can desecrate the bodies of murdered infidels.

Aristocratic and very wealthy Democrats — Al Gore, Ted Kennedy, Howard Dean, and John Kerry — employ the language of conspiracy to assure us that we had no reason to fight Saddam Hussein. "Lies," "worst," and " betrayed" are the vocabulary of their daily attacks. A jester in stripes like Michael Moore, who cannot tell the truth, is now an artistic icon — precisely and only because of his own hatred of the president and the inconvenient idea that we are really at war. Our diplomats court the Arab League, which snores when Russians and Sudanese kill hundreds of thousands of Muslims but shrieks when we remove those who kill even more of their own. And a depopulating, entitlement-expanding Europe believes an American president, not bin Laden, is the greatest threat to world peace. Russia, the slayer of tens of thousands of Muslim Chechans and a big-time profiteer from Baathist loot, lectures the United States on its insensitivity to the new democracy in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, in Europe, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East, we see the same old bloodcurdling threats, the horrific videos, the bombings, the obligatory pause, the faux negotiations, the lies — and then, of course, the bloodcurdling threats, the horrific videos, the bombings...

No, bin Laden is quite sane — but lately I have grown more worried that we are not.

Tuesday, June 22, 2004

WHEN EMPIRES WANE

The End of Power
Without American hegemony the world would likely return to the dark ages.

BY NIALL FERGUSON
Monday, June 21, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always bidding for hegemony. Today it is the United States; a century ago it was Britain. Before that, it was the French, the Spaniards and so on. The 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict.

Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The "unipolarity" identified by commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will arise, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world.

But what if this view is wrong? What if the world is heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Though the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers--whether civilizations, empires or nation states--they have not wholly overlooked eras when power has receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, instead of a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to it. This could turn out to mean a new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic rapine in the world's no-go zones; of economic stagnation and a retreat by civilization into a few fortified enclaves.

Why might a power vacuum arise early in the 21st century? The reasons are not especially hard to imagine.

• The clay feet of the colossus. The U.S. suffers from at least three structural deficits that will limit the effectiveness and duration of its crypto-imperial role in the world. The first is the nation's growing dependence on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption. It is difficult to recall any empire that has long endured after becoming so dependent on lending from abroad. The second deficit relates to manpower: The U.S. is a net importer of people and cannot therefore underpin its hegemonic aspirations with real colonization; at the same time, its relatively small volunteer army is already spread very thin as a result of recent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, the U.S. is afflicted by what is best called an attention deficit. Its republican institutions make it difficult to establish a consensus for long-term "nation-building" projects.

• "Old Europe" grows older. Those who dream that the European Union might become a counterweight to the U.S. should continue slumbering. Impressive though the EU's enlargement has been, the reality is that demography likely condemns it to decline in international influence. With fertility rates dropping and life expectancies rising, European societies may, within less than 50 years, display median ages in the upper 40s. Indeed, "Old Europe" will soon be truly old. By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards and Greeks will be 65 or over, even allowing for immigration. Europeans therefore face an agonizing choice between "Americanizing" their economies, i.e., opening their borders to much more immigration, with the cultural changes that would entail, or transforming their union into a fortified retirement community.

• China's coming economic crisis. Optimistic observers of China insist that the economic miracle of the past decade will not fade--that growth will continue at such a pace that within three or four decades China's GDP will surpass that of the U.S. Yet it is far from clear that the normal rules that apply to emerging markets have been suspended for Beijing's benefit. First, a fundamental incompatibility exists between the free-market economy, based inevitably on private property and the rule of law, and the persistence of the Communist monopoly on power, which breeds rent-seeking and corruption, and impedes the creation of transparent institutions. As usual in "Asian tiger" economies, production is running far ahead of domestic consumption--thus making the economy heavily dependent on exports. No one knows the full extent of the problems in the Chinese domestic banking sector. Western banks that are buying up bad debts with a view to establishing themselves in China must remember that this strategy was tried a century ago, in the era of the Open Door policy, when American and European firms rushed into China only to see their investments vanish in the smoke of war and revolution. Then, as now, hopes for China's development ran euphorically high, especially in the U.S. But those hopes were disappointed, and could be disappointed again. A Chinese currency or banking crisis could have earth-shaking ramifications, especially when foreign investors realize the difficulty of repatriating assets held in China.

• The fragmentation of Islamic civilization. With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European average, Islamic countries are bound to put pressure on Europe and the U.S. in the years ahead. If, as is forecast, the population of Yemen will exceed that of Russia by 2050, there must be either dramatic improvements in the Middle East's economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab world to senescent Europe. Yet the subtle colonization of Europe's cities by Muslims does not necessarily portend the advent of a new and menacing "Eurabia." In fact, the Muslim world is as divided as it has ever been. This division is not merely between Sunni and Shiite. It is also between those seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West (embodied in Turkey's desire to join the EU) and those drawn to the Islamic Bolshevism of the likes of Osama bin Laden. Opinion polls from Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-American sentiment, but not unanimity. In Europe, only a minority expresses overt sympathy for terrorist organizations; most young Muslims in England clearly prefer assimilation to jihad. We are a long way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new caliphate that might pose a geopolitical threat to the U.S.

In short, each of the obvious 21st-century hegemons--the U.S., Europe, China--seems to contain within it the seeds of decline; while Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics, lacking the resources of a superpower.





Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservativism meets its match in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in withdrawal: from empire to decolonization in 24 months. Suppose also that no rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums--not only in Iraq but conceivably also Afghanistan, to say nothing of the Balkans and Haiti. What would an "apolar" future look like?
The answer is not easy, since there have been very few periods in history with no contenders for the role of global or at least regional hegemon. The nearest approximation might be the 1920s, when the U.S. walked away from Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security. But that power vacuum was short-lived. The West Europeans quickly snapped up the leftovers of Ottoman rule in the Middle East, while the Bolsheviks reassembled the Tsarist empire.

Indeed, one must go back much further in history to find a period of true and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries, when the heirs of the Roman empire--Rome and Byzantium--had receded from the height of their power, when the Abbasid caliphate was also waning and when the Chinese empire was languishing between the Tang and Sung dynasties. In the absence of strong secular polities, it was religious institutions--the Papacy, the monastic orders, the Muslim ulema--that often set the political agenda. That helps explain why the period culminated with the holy war known as the Crusades. Yet this clash of civilizations was in many ways just one more example of the apolar world's susceptibility to long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings were perhaps the principal beneficiaries of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small defensible entities like the Venetian republic or the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of England.

Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of that troubled time? Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after World War II? The U.N., the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO each regards itself as in some way representing the "international community." Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages?

Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo.

Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it.

For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad.

The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East.

The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for.

Mr. Ferguson, professor of history at NYU and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, is the author of "Colossus: The Price of America's Empire" (Penguin, 2004). A longer version of this article appears in the upcoming edition of Foreign Policy.

Unfairenheit 9/11
The lies of Michael Moore.

CLICK_HERE

Please read this! Click on Pic above.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, June 21, 2004, at 12:26 PM PT

Friday, June 18, 2004

In Solidarity
The Polish people, hungry for justice, preferred "cowboys" over Communists.

BY LECH WALESA
Friday, June 11, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

GDANSK, Poland--When talking about Ronald Reagan, I have to be personal. We in Poland took him so personally. Why? Because we owe him our liberty. This can't be said often enough by people who lived under oppression for half a century, until communism fell in 1989.

Poles fought for their freedom for so many years that they hold in special esteem those who backed them in their struggle. Support was the test of friendship. President Reagan was such a friend. His policy of aiding democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe in the dark days of the Cold War meant a lot to us. We knew he believed in a few simple principles such as human rights, democracy and civil society. He was someone who was convinced that the citizen is not for the state, but vice-versa, and that freedom is an innate right.

I often wondered why Ronald Reagan did this, taking the risks he did, in supporting us at Solidarity, as well as dissident movements in other countries behind the Iron Curtain, while pushing a defense buildup that pushed the Soviet economy over the brink. Let's remember that it was a time of recession in the U.S. and a time when the American public was more interested in their own domestic affairs. It took a leader with a vision to convince them that there are greater things worth fighting for. Did he seek any profit in such a policy? Though our freedom movements were in line with the foreign policy of the United States, I doubt it.

I distinguish between two kinds of politicians. There are those who view politics as a tactical game, a game in which they do not reveal any individuality, in which they lose their own face. There are, however, leaders for whom politics is a means of defending and furthering values. For them, it is a moral pursuit. They do so because the values they cherish are endangered. They're convinced that there are values worth living for, and even values worth dying for. Otherwise they would consider their life and work pointless. Only such politicians are great politicians and Ronald Reagan was one of them.

The 1980s were a curious time--a time of realization that a new age was upon us. Communism was coming to an end. It had used up its means and possibilities. The ground was set for change. But this change needed the cooperation, or unspoken understanding, of different political players. Now, from the perspective of our time, it is obvious that like the pieces of a global chain of events, Ronald Reagan, John Paul II, Margaret Thatcher and even Mikhail Gorbachev helped bring about this new age in Europe. We at Solidarity like to claim more than a little credit, too, for bringing about the end of the Cold War.

In the Europe of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan presented a vision. For us in Central and Eastern Europe, that meant freedom from the Soviets. Mr. Reagan was no ostrich who hoped that problems might just go away. He thought that problems are there to be faced. This is exactly what he did.

Every time I met President Reagan, at his private estate in California or at the Lenin shipyard here in Gdansk, I was amazed by his modesty and even temper. He didn't fit the stereotype of the world leader that he was. Privately, we were like opposite sides of a magnet: He was always composed; I was a raging tower of emotions eager to act. We were so different yet we never had a problem with understanding one another. I respected his honesty and good humor. It gave me confidence in his policies and his resolve. He supported my struggle, but what unified us, unmistakably, were our similar values and shared goals.





I have often been asked in the United States to sign the poster that many Americans consider very significant. Prepared for the first almost-free parliamentary elections in Poland in 1989, the poster shows Gary Cooper as the lonely sheriff in the American Western, "High Noon." Under the headline "At High Noon" runs the red Solidarity banner and the date--June 4, 1989--of the poll. It was a simple but effective gimmick that, at the time, was misunderstood by the Communists. They, in fact, tried to ridicule the freedom movement in Poland as an invention of the "Wild" West, especially the U.S.
But the poster had the opposite impact: Cowboys in Western clothes had become a powerful symbol for Poles. Cowboys fight for justice, fight against evil, and fight for freedom, both physical and spiritual. Solidarity trounced the Communists in that election, paving the way for a democratic government in Poland. It is always so touching when people bring this poster up to me to autograph it. They have cherished it for so many years and it has become the emblem of the battle that we all fought together.

As I say repeatedly, we owe so much to all those who supported us. Perhaps in the early years, we didn't express enough gratitude. We were so busy introducing all the necessary economic and political reforms in our reborn country. Yet President Ronald Reagan must have realized what remarkable changes he brought to Poland, and indeed the rest of the world. And I hope he felt gratified. He should have.

Mr. Walesa, winner of the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, was president of Poland from 1990 to 1995.